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I. Introduction
“You going to pay for this shit you’re doing. I don't give a fuck
if you call the cops or not. Fuck them. Fuck the cops. Fuck the
Judge. Fuck your God damn lawyer, period.”1 This is one of the
many threatening messages Eric Nolen left on his ex-girlfriend’s
voicemail three hours before showing up at her house and
attacking her.2 After leaving this message, Nolen drove to his exgirlfriend’s house and brutally attacked her; Nolen forced his exgirlfriend to the ground, kicked her fifteen to twenty times in the
chest and abdomen, and caused her to urinate on herself.3
Throughout the attack the victim was screaming so loud that
multiple neighbors came to the scene and witnessed the abuse.4
As a result, the victim was left with a bloody lip, large bruises on
her chest and abdomen, and bruises on her face in the shape of a
shoeprint.5 In the voicemail message, Nolen was referring to his
disregard for the protection order that his ex-girlfriend of
fourteen years had received approximately two weeks before the
encounter.6 Following the incident, Nolen was arrested and
1. Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d
920 (Va. 2009) (No. 2422-07-1), 2008 WL 6913864, at *1.
2. Id. at 3–5.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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convicted after a bench trial for felonious violation of a protection
order.7
This is the typical situation where a protection order must be
fully and rigorously enforced in order to protect a woman8 who is
the victim of an abusive relationship.9 In contrast, consider Mark
Hunt’s arrest for his violation of a protection order.10 On
February 16, 2010, Stephanie Hunt obtained a protection order
against her husband that prevented Mark from having any

7. Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d 920, 921 (Va. 2009).
8. For the purpose of uniformity, this Note refers to the petitioner as
female and the respondent as male because this is the traditional situation in
which reports of abuse arise, with the male as the batterer and the female as
the victim. See Linda M. Peterman & Charlotte G. Dixon, Assessment and
Evaluation of Men Who Batter Women, J. OF REHABILITATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 38
(“[I]t has been reported . . . that the male is the abuser in 95% of domestic
violence cases . . . .”). There has been a trend in recent years that more men are
becoming the victims of abuse. See Bert H. Hoff, US National Survey: More Men
Than Women Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 4 J. OF AGGRESSION,
CONFLICT & PEACE RES. 155, 155 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/
17596591211244166 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (finding more men than women
had been abused in 2011, with “an estimated 5,365,000 men and 4,741,000
women [as] victims of intimate partner physical violence” in the last year) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Additionally, studies have
shown “that domestic violence occurs in same-sex relationships at
approximately the same rate as it does in heterosexual relationships,” meaning
the petitioner and the respondent could be members of the same sex. Ronald F.
Bobner, Amy J. Miller & John W. Zarski, Sexual Identity Development: A Base
for Work with Same-Sex Couple Partner Abuse, 22 CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY 189,
189 (2000).
9. Recent studies have shown that a higher number of women act as the
primary perpetrator than previously thought. These studies illustrate the
difficulty of implementing a one-sided protection order when there is mutual
abuse within the relationship. See Irene Hanson Frieze & Maureen C. McHugh,
Intimate Partner Violence: New Directions, 1087 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 121,
132 (2006) (examining a study of heterosexual couples in stable relationships
and finding “[m]ore men than women reported being the targets of one-sided
violence, and more women than men reported being the violent one in the
couple”); Suzanne C. Swan et al., National Institute of Health, A Review of
Research on Women’s Use of Violence with Male Intimate Partners, 23 VIOLENCE
& VICTIMS 301, 313 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
2968709/pdf/nihms244725.pdf (illustrating the prevalence of women abusers
and the need for interventions to examine the circumstances of abuse rather
than assuming typical patterned abuse).
10. State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr.
19, 2012).
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contact with Stephanie.11 A little over a month later, Stephanie
began “ha[ving] trouble breathing and walking up the stairs,
vomited, and may have had pneumonia.”12 While it is not clear
how the couple came into contact, the couple used the
speakerphone function of Mark’s phone to contact the district
court and request information on how to end the protection order
so that Mark could help Stephanie.13 Following this call, Mark
drove Stephanie to the hospital, where she received prescription
medicine to assist with her symptoms.14 Stephanie acknowledged
that she could have taken a taxi or bus to the hospital rather
than relying on Mark,15 but she wanted to get the protection
order dropped because “she was afraid she would end up in the
hospital . . . and there would be no one to take care of their
children except for [Mark].”16
Following the visit to the hospital, Mark and Stephanie went
to the district court to remove the protection order.17 It became
clear that Stephanie was not ready to have the order removed
when she began crying in front of an administrative assistant in
the courthouse.18 The assistant then had Mark Hunt arrested,19
charged with a violation of a protection order, and eventually
convicted and sentenced to six months of probation.20
These two scenarios illustrate the stark difference in
circumstances that can lead to a protection order violation. Eric
Nolen’s actions are the perfect example of a situation where
protection orders and the violations that result are the necessary
and appropriate penalty for the abuser.21 Nolen contacted his ex11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Brief of Appellee at 1, State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535
(Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2012).
17. Brief of Appellant at 7–8, Hunt, 2012 WL 3966535.
18. Id.
19. Brief of Appellee at 2–3, Hunt, 2012 WL 3966535.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d
920, 921 (Va. 2009) (No. 2422-07-1), 2008 WL 6913864, at *1.
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girlfriend without being provoked and arrived at her house to
severely beat her.22 He chose to blatantly disregard the legal
protection in order to abuse his former girlfriend.23 There was no
excuse or defense to his actions, and his punishment was
appropriate.24
In contrast, Mark Hunt’s actions question the enforcement
mechanisms of the protection order system.25 On paper, Hunt
violated the protection order, but a full look at the circumstances
of the violation and arrest highlights how blameless his actions
truly were.26 Although the court did the right thing in not
removing the protection order, the conviction of Hunt was an
improper penalty for his actions.27 The couple was still married,
and both parties likely still had feelings for each other, making it
very difficult for Hunt not to volunteer to help his wife and
mother of his son to the hospital.28
Civil protection orders29 are the leading tool in preventing
the maltreatment of women in abusive relationships, offering an
effective and low-cost solution to the hardship of domestic
violence.30 These orders are designed to protect the victim of an
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d 920, 921 (Va. 2009) (affirming
Nolen’s conviction for felonious violation of a protection order).
25. See State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App.
Sept. 7, 2012) (determining that Stephanie sought assistance from Mark in
getting to the hospital when she was suffering from symptoms of pneumonia).
26. Id.
27. See id. at *4 (“Stephanie had obtained the protection order without
Mark’s help, and she could have sought its modification or removal without his
help.”).
28. See id. at *1 (“[T]hey were afraid that Mark wouldn’t be allowed to care
for the children if Stephanie were seriously ill, perhaps hospitalized . . . .”).
29. There are many names given to protection orders that are often used
interchangeably. These include: no-contact order, stay-away order, restraining
order, harassment order, and order for protection among others. VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RES., http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/survivor
brochure/survivorbrochure.html#id56863 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Unless otherwise mentioned in the text,
this Note will use the term “protection order” to encompass all of these possible
terms.
30. See T.K. Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Orders Effective in
Stopping or Reducing Partner Violence, CARSEY INST. 1, 1 (2011),
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abusive relationship, while also penalizing the perpetrator for his
criminal actions.31 The law of domestic violence has worked
diligently to create safeguards from this violence, but as the law
develops, there is a need to recognize the changing dynamics of
society.
The problem with the current approach is that not all
abusive relationships are one sided, and while one partner may
be considered the victim, there is often a more complex story,
sometimes involving mutual abuse.32 A civil protection order is
effective in the traditional model of abuse where there is one
abuser and one victim; however, some abusive relationships
involve mutual abuse and manipulation, which cannot be
remedied in the same manner.33 Although the actions of the
protected party may only play a role in the violation in the small
minority of cases, there is still a need to analyze this grey area
where the protected party has played too egregious of a role to go
unnoticed.34 This Note highlights the discrepancies in the courts’
approach to assessing and sanctioning protection order violations,
http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/IB-Logan-Civil-ProtectiveOrder.pdf (“Civil protective orders are effective in reducing partner violence for
many women. For half the women in the sample, a protective order stopped the
violence. For the other half, the orders significantly reduced violence and
abuse.”); Jeremy Travis, Department of Justice, Civil Protection Orders: Victim’s
Views on Effectiveness, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., Jan. 1998, at 2 (analyzing a study
of women who had sought protection orders and finding that seventy-two
percent of participants felt their life had improved, “more than 90 percent
reported feeling better about themselves, and 80 percent felt safer”).
31. See Tara L. Cornelius, Allison Kunde & Ryan C. Shorey, Legal
Consequences of Dating Violence: A Critical Review and Directions for Improved
Behavioral Contingencies, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 194, 199 (2009)
(describing the advantages of civil protection orders “including increasing safety
of the primary victim, potentially deterring future violence, and providing the
victim with some degree of control over the aberrant situation”).
32. See id. at 202 (“[T]he vast majority of dating violence involves mutual
violence, such that an individual likely has experienced both victimization and
perpetration . . . .”).
33. Id.
34. In a study conducted of 663 protection orders taken out in the Qunicy
Court of Massachusetts in 1990, 48.4% of the abusers re-abused their victim
within two years of the issuance of a protection order. Andrew R. Klein, ReAbuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers, in DO ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
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and advocates for a nuanced assessment of violations, rather
than simply punishing the supposed abuser automatically.
To set the background for obtaining and enforcing a
protection order, Part II of this Note provides information on how
a petitioner obtains an order, the relief available from the court,
the possible duration of orders, and the procedure for enforcing
and processing a violation of a protection order.35
Part III explores the injustice of the current system, looking
specifically at how the petitioner’s role in the violation is
considered when sanctioning the respondent.36 Protection orders
are structured so that one person is forbidden from making
contact, while the other has no restrictions placed on
communicating.37 This structure leaves the victim free to contact
the restrained party, while the restrained party can be arrested
for even the slightest contact.38 With this framework, the victim
has been given a free pass to contact her abuser, and even invite
him to come over, without being penalized.39 This Part will
examine the flaws of this system, advocating for a greater
emphasis on the female petitioner’s role in the violation, while
also finding a balance between her fragile state and the possible
abuse of the respondent.40
Part IV looks at the legal system’s current approach to the
problems of inducement.41 Additionally, this Part will look at the
35. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the system of obtaining and
enforcing a protection order).
36. See infra Part III (analyzing the problems with the current enforcement
of protection orders when a respondent was enticed into coming into contact).
37. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2012) (providing the restrictions that can
be placed on the respondent to a protection order); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2012)
(listing the restraints that can be placed on the respondent); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-924.03 (2012) (stating that a respondent may not receive a protection order
unless they file their own complaint or the court finds evidence supporting the
issuance of a protection order against the petitioner).
38. See KEITH GUZIK, ARRESTING ABUSE 44 (2009) (recounting a case where
the petitioner reached out to the respondent to remove his belongings from their
shared home and upon arrival was arrested for violating the protection order).
39. See id. (“This happens all the time. Girls call a guy over when a nocontact order is in effect. He comes over and she calls the cops.”).
40. See infra Part III (analyzing the rationale behind the protection of the
woman and considering the role of battered women’s syndrome in the process).
41. See infra Part IV (examining different state court’s approaches to the
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possibility of mutual protection orders as a solution to this
problem.42 This Note recognizes the flaws of mutual protection
orders—including the risk of nonenforcement, the possible
violation of due process, and the psychological effects that a
mutual protection order might have on both the respondent and
the petitioner—and rejects this option as a solution to the
problem of inducement.43
Part V suggests more constructive solutions to the injustice,
seeking a balance between a woman’s enticement of the
respondent into a violation, and the respondent’s possible abuse
of the system.44 This Part looks at how the implementation of a
new judicial mechanism, that comes into play after a violation
has occurred, can help to remedy the issue of unjust
enforcement.45
II. Background
Protection orders are civil remedies that provide protection to
a victim of domestic violence by requiring the respondent to stay
away from the petitioner.46 This protection is offered by statute in
all fifty states, with most states having the option of issuing
temporary or emergency protection orders, as well as permanent

victim’s role in the violation and the backlash that some of these decisions have
created).
42. A mutual protection order prevents both parties from contacting each
other, sometimes without requiring a mutual showing of abuse. See Catherine
F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders
Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 266 (1996) (“A
mutual protection order is an order entered against both parties, requiring both
to abide by the restraints and other forms of relief in the civil protection order.”).
43. See infra Part IV.D.2 (looking at how courts and scholars have
approached the problem currently and seeking to find a trend in what is the
appropriate remedy for the injustice).
44. See infra Part V (exploring possible solutions to the inequity that
results when a respondent comes into contact with his victim after being
repeatedly provoked).
45. Infra Part V.
46. See DIANE KIESEL, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
1077 (2007) (explaining the purpose and process of attaining a protection order).

THE ROLE OF ENTICEMENT

1481

protection orders.47 To receive protection, the victim petitions the
court for a formal order that will prohibit the abuser from
contacting the victim for a certain period of time.48 This provides
the woman with the independence to decide whether she needs
protection, as well as providing protection “whether or not [her]
abuser[] face[s] criminal charges.”49 Each state has its own
procedure and requirements for obtaining a protection order, as
well as variations in the relief, duration, and sanctions
available.50
A. Requirements for Obtaining an Order of Protection
To obtain a protection order, the victim must file a petition in
court, typically in the family division of a civil court.51 Most states
require that the victim have a specific relationship with her
abuser to qualify for the order.52 This relationship includes
current and former spouses, family members related by blood,
current or former household members, persons in intimate
relationships, and individuals who have a child in common.53 In
47. Catherine F. Klein & Leslie E. Orloff, Protective Orders and Other
Injunctive Relief: Civil Protection Orders, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAW, POLICY,
AND PRACTICE 1078, 1078 (2007) (explaining the differences between temporary
and permanent protection orders).
48. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 1079 (describing the process of obtaining
a protection order).
49. Id.
50. See Protective Orders, 0080 SURVEYS 19 (Westlaw) (citing the
statutes for obtaining a protection order for all fifty states).
51. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 1078 (noting that most orders of
protection are petitioned for in the “family divisions of civil court”).
52. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2012) (requiring the respondent in a
petition for an order of protection to be a household member); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-15 (2012) (requiring the abuse to have been committed “by another family
or household member”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2010) (requiring
the domestic violence to occur between household members); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1101(a) (2012) (requiring the abuse to occur between family or household
members).
53. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 47, at 1079 (listing the relationships
normally required to attain a protection order). One of the difficulties of defining
these relationships is determining what a statute means by “intimate
relationship.” See Devon M. Largio, Refining the Meaning and Application of
“Dating Relationship” Language in Domestic Violence Statutes, 60 VAND. L. REV.
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order to make this process easier, many court systems provide
form pleading and court mediators prior to appearing before a
judge.54
Following the initial petition, most jurisdictions will issue an
ex parte temporary55 protection order. Because this is an ex parte
petition, the respondent does not need to be present for the order
to be issued.56 Following this issuance, the respondent will be
served with the temporary order and notified of the court date
when the permanent order will be issued.57 A temporary order
normally lasts ten to twenty-one days, or until the permanent
protection order is issued; if an emergency order is issued, it
typically lasts seventy-two hours, but sometimes it can be as
short as the court’s next business day.58
939, 958–60 (2007) (explaining some of the difficulties of interpreting what a
statute means by intimate relationship). Statutes that allow dating as one of the
qualifying relationships often include factors that are considered when
determining if a dating relationship exists. See id. (describing various
requirements that states have created to help define what qualifies as an
intimate relationship). For example, in the Vermont statute that defines a
dating relationship, the factors include, “(A) the nature of the relationship; (B)
the length of time the relationship has existed; (C) the frequency of interaction
between the parties; [and] (D) the length of time since the relationship was
terminated, if applicable.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(a) (2012).
54. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 47, at 1080 (“Most jurisdictions provide
form pleading to facilitate the process of petitioning for a protection order.”).
55. Each state has its own statute containing the requirements for
obtaining a temporary protection order. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14102(4)(a) (2012) (“A temporary civil protection order may be issued if the issuing
judge or magistrate finds that an imminent danger exists to the person or
persons seeking protection under the civil protection order.”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3106(b) (2012) (“Prior to the hearing on the petition and upon a finding of
good cause shown, the court on motion of a party may enter such temporary
relief orders . . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-4(A)(1) (2012) (“Upon the filing of a
petition for order of protection, the court shall: immediately grant an ex parte
temporary order of protection without bond if there is probable cause . . . that an
act of domestic abuse has occurred. . . .”).
56. See Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for
Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 54
(2000) (describing the process of obtaining a civil protection order).
57. See id. (providing the steps of obtaining a civil protection order).
58. See NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT,
PROTECTION ORDER DURATIONS MATRIX (2012), http://www.fullfaithandcredit.org/
files/bwjp/files/State%20Protection%20Order%20Duration%20Matrix%20%2872012%29.pdf [hereinafter PROTECTION ORDER DURATIONS MATRIX] (listing the
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Once the initial order is issued, the petitioner needs to
appear in court again to receive her final protection order.59 At
this hearing, the respondent has the opportunity to refute any of
the claims and present evidence demonstrating that the order is
inappropriate.60 For a final order, most states only require the
petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
respondent abused the petitioner in some way and the abuse is
likely to occur again.61 If the respondent does not appear at the
hearing, the temporary order can be extended for a specified
amount of time, or a final order can be put in place without the
respondent’s presence.62 This final order can last from one to five
years,63 with some states offering permanent orders, meaning the
respondent is indefinitely prohibited from any contact with the
petitioner.64
duration of the various types of protection orders that can be issued in each
state).
59. See Waul, supra note 56, at 54 (“The petitioner then must return to
court to obtain the permanent order . . . and participate in a hearing where the
respondent has the opportunity to challenge the CPO [civil protection order]
request.”).
60. See id. (describing the options available to the defendant in refuting an
order for protection).
61. See id. (describing the process of obtaining a civil protection order);
A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STANDARDS OF PROOF FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
CIVIL
PROTECTION
ORDERS
(CPOS)
BY
STATE
(2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs/Standards_
of_Proof_by_State.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PROOF]
(providing the standards of proof for each state and the corresponding statute).
62. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 47, at 1079 (“Courts also issue protection
orders after full hearing, by consent, or by default.”).
63. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (2012) (“Any relief granted by
the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year.”); MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6(b) (2012) (“Any relief granted by the order for protection shall
be for a period not to exceed two years, except when the court determines a
longer period is appropriate.”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2012)
(“A[n] . . . order of protection may be effective for a maximum period of two years
or, when aggravating circumstances are found, may be effective for a maximum
period of five years.”).
64. See ALA. CODE § 50-5-7(d)(2) (2012) (“Any final protection order is of
permanent duration unless otherwise specified or modified by a subsequent
court order.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2012) (“These orders may be
renewed . . . either for five years or permanently.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1045(f) (“[T]he Court may grant no contact relief . . . for as long as reasonably
necessary . . . up to and including the entry of a permanent order of the Court.”).
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B. Relief Available

Once a petitioner meets her burden of showing abuse, the
court has broad authority to issue various forms of relief that it
determines necessary.65 Depending on the state, relief can either
be issued through the temporary order, or the petitioner may
have to wait until the final protection order is issued to receive
the full relief available.66
This Note focuses on the relief offered by a no-contact
provision, which forbids the respondent from making any contact
with the petitioner, whether or not the contact involves abuse.67
65. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 1100 (“The scope of the relief that may be
ordered . . . is very broad. The court has the power to do what is necessary to
stop the family violence and keep the victims safe.”); NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION
ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, PROTECTION ORDER RELIEF MATRIX (2012),
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/Protection_Order_Relief_Matrix_2012.pdf
(listing the duration of the various types of protection orders that can be issued
in each state). The respondent may be required to surrender his firearms to
police; continue paying utility bills; move out of the shared home; refrain from
using a shared vehicle; stay away from the school or day care center of a shared
child; refrain from disposing of shared personal property; or comply with one of
the many other injunctions that are available depending on the state statute.
See id. (listing some of the nonobvious types of injunctions that a court can
issue).
66. See PROTECTION ORDER DURATIONS MATRIX, supra note 58 (listing the
duration of the various types of protection orders that can be issued in each
state). Once a no-contact order is issued the court may provide law enforcement
officers to assist the petitioner in removing the petitioner’s or respondent’s
possessions from a shared household to avoid any further abuse or a violation of
the order. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201 (2011) (providing that the court
may “direct[] an appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the
petitioner to the residence to ensure that the petitioner safely obtains possession
of the residence, automobile, or other essential personal property or to supervise
the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of essential personal property”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2012) (stating that the court may issue “an order
requiring that a law enforcement officer accompany either party to the residence
or any shared business premises to supervise the removal of personal belongings
in order to ensure the personal safety of the plaintiff when a restraining order
has been issued”).
67. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (2012) (providing that one form of relief
the court can issue is an order “prohibit[ing] the abusing party directly or
through an agent from contacting the petitioner or victim except under specific
conditions named in the order”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306 (2012) (listing one
form of relief as preventing the respondent “from . . . telephoning, contacting, or
otherwise communicating, directly or indirectly, with the petitioner and any
designated family member or specifically designated person of the respondent’s
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Judges see this as the most effective form of preventing further
abuse because it does not merely prevent abuse of the victim, but
instead prevents any contact whatsoever.68 The no-contact
provision is considered a crucial advantage of a protection order
because it prevents the abuser from luring the victim back into
the relationship by sending flowers or notes that will make the
victim believe the abuser is going to change his behavior.69 These
provisions are especially relevant because the abuser’s slightest
communication can result in a violation of the no-contact order,
even in situations where the victim initiates the contact.70
C. Duration of the Order
Once an order is issued, the order lasts for a set duration.71
Following this time period, the petitioner can renew the order by
offering sufficient evidence that the order is still necessary to
prevent abuse.72 If the petitioner decides the order is no longer
household”); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(4) (2012) (stating that the order can include
a provision that “[r]equires the respondent to stay away from or have no contact
with the petitioner and any other protected persons or locations”).
68. See A Roundtable Discussion on Domestic Violence, HOUS. LAW.,
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 24, 27 (quoting Judge Davies of the of the 177th Criminal
District Court of Harris, Texas, as stating, “I will make a condition of that bail
that they have no contact. . . . I don’t care if it’s a love note—you know you’re not
going to send flowers[, y]ou’re not going to have any contact or communication
whatsoever”).
69. See id. (“The ‘no contact’ order has a huge advantage because it means
he can’t call her and tell her he loves her, and beg her to come back and do the
honeymoon thing.”).
70. See State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ohio 2003) (finding a
respondent in violation of a protection order even though the petitioner invited
the respondent over to her home to celebrate their child’s birthday).
71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing the average length of
a protection order).
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (2012) (“Orders may be extended
only after the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic
violence has occurred since the entry of the order, a violation of the order has
occurred, if the respondent consents to the extension of the order or for good
cause shown.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2) (2012) (“The court may extend the
order if the court, after hearing at which the defendant has the opportunity to
be heard, finds that the defendant continues to pose a threat to the safety of the
victim, persons residing with the victim, or members of the victim’s immediate
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necessary before the expiration of the order, she needs to formally
have the court rescind the order.73
Sometimes petitioners will decide to reinitiate their
relationship with their abuser without going through the
necessary steps to officially remove the order. This places the
respondent at immediate risk of being held in violation of the
order because most states do not consider reconciliation or the
petitioner’s invitation as a defense to a violation.74 There are
some courts that have found reconciliation and a couple’s return
to their pre-protection order relationship renders the protection
order null, removing the risk of penalty from both parties.75

family.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007(2) (2012) (“[T]he court may extend an
order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it determines
necessary to protect the plaintiff or minor child from abuse.”).
73. See D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2012) (stating that a judicial officer “may,
upon motion of any party to the original proceeding, extend, rescind, or modify
the order for good cause shown”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6 (2012) (“Injunctive
orders shall continue until modified or rescinded upon motion by either party or
until the court approves a subsequent consent agreement entered into by the
parties.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (2012) (stating that a protection order
will last five years “unless extended, modified, vacated or rescinded upon motion
by either party or if the court approves any consent agreement entered into by
the plaintiff and defendant”).
74. See Dixon v. State, 869 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(determining that an invitation by the petitioner is not a defense in respondent’s
violation of a protection order); City of N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d
1225, 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“When the General Assembly enacted this law,
it clearly intended that the victim could not by his or her action alter the effect
of the law. The General Assembly intended that no victim could waive the
effects of the [protection order].”); State v. Dejarlais, 969 P.2d 90, 92 (Wash.
1998) (finding that “consent should not be a defense to violating a domestic
violence protection order”).
75. See Mohamed v. Mohamed, 557 A.2d 696, 698 (N.J. App. Div. 1989)
(finding a protection order void because “the domestic violence action [was]
resolved by the parties, [and] the reconciliation should end the matter [because
t]he reconciliation of the parties destroys the viability of a domestic violence
order”).
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D. Violation of the Order
1. The Violation
Once the protection order is put in place, a violation occurs
when the respondent disregards the provisions of the order,
typically through contact with the petitioner.76 The key
requirement for a violation to result in a penalty is that the
forbidden contact must be reported to the police.77 Without
reporting, the abuser will not bear any penalty because a
protection order is not a self-enforcing mechanism.78 For a
violation to occur, the victim must report the contact or abuse,
and a formal arrest must occur.79
Until recently, police officers have been criticized for their
inadequate response to calls of domestic abuse and protection
order violations.80 This lack of officer response largely relied on
“an unspoken assumption that internal family disputes largely
fell outside of their area of responsibility.”81 In recent years there
76. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslie E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 801, 1095 (1993) (“Offenders may routinely violate orders, if they believe
there is no real risk of being arrested . . . . For enforcement to work, the courts
need to monitor compliance, victims must report violations, and, most of all,
police, prosecutors, and judges should respond sternly to violations . . . .”).
77. See id. (noting that without a report of a violation there is no way for a
violation to occur).
78. See id. (explaining that there is no method for verifying whether an
abuser has come into contact with the protected party).
79. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 767 (2005)
(finding that an individual does not “have a property interest in police
enforcement of [a] restraining order” and therefore it is up to the discretion of
the police to enforce the order).
80. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM 46 (1999)
(detailing the failed responses of police officers in making arrests, specifically
noting police training materials which recommended avoiding arrest if possible);
Eve S. Buzawa & David Hirschel, Evolution of the Police Response to Domestic
Violence, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 69, 69–70
(Evan Stark & Eve S. Buzawa eds., 2009) (describing the lack of police
enforcement of domestic abuse situations up until the past 30 years); Damon
Phillips, Civil Protection Orders: Issues in Obtainment, Enforcement and
Effectiveness, 61 J. MO. B. 29, 33 (2005) (providing examples of where a police
officer’s failure to act resulted in drastic consequences).
81. Buzawa & Hirschel, supra note 80, at 69.
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has been a shift to better police enforcement, with many states
now having mandatory-arrest policies for any incident that
involves domestic abuse.82 Additionally, many officers are now
better equipped for dealing with a violation of a protection order
because of increased training and education on enforcing orders.83
In furtherance of this mission, many states now require the police
officer to inform the victim of the legal rights and services that
are available to victims of abuse in their jurisdiction.84
2. Processing the Violation
Once a violation has been reported and the abuser has been
arrested, the violation can result in both civil and criminal
penalties.85 Civilly, the respondent may be held in contempt of
court; criminally, the respondent may face criminal penalties
depending on the state statute.86 In the majority of states, the
criminal penalty is the primary method for truly penalizing a
defendant, with “the overwhelming majority treat[ing] the

82. See A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST
POLICIES BY STATE (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/domviol/docs/Domestic_Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.auth
checkdam.pdf (listing each state’s arrest policy, typically having a mandatory
arrest or pro-arrest policy).
83. See NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT,
PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S
GUIDE TO ENFORCING PROTECTION ORDERS NATIONWIDE 1–20 (2006), http://
www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/LawEnforcement_031411_Web.pdf (providing law
enforcement officers with a pamphlet on the proper process for enforcing a
protection order).
84. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.080 (2012) (“The officer at the scene of an
alleged incident of abuse shall inform the abused party of available judicial
remedies for relief from adult abuse and of available shelters for victims of
domestic violence.”).
85. See Robin R. Runge, ABA Standards Safeguard Domestic Violence,
Sexual Assault, and Stalking Victims, 26 CHILD. L. PRAC. 142, 142 (2007) (“The
court may order civil remedies including temporary custody, child support, and
restitution, as well as require the respondent to refrain from further criminal
contact. Moreover, violations of the order may be criminally or civilly
enforced.”).
86. See id. (explaining possible civil and criminal penalties that may arise
from the violation of an order).
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violation as a misdemeanor.”87 For some states, the violation of
the order is even more serious, resulting in a felony in Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Washington.88
The victim has two paths she can take to penalize the abuser:
(1) personally file a form for civil contempt;89 or (2) alert local law
enforcement of the violation and have the district attorney
prosecute the violation.90 If the victim chooses the civil path, she
is responsible for filing the form for civil contempt, where she
recounts the violation of the order and attaches any police report
of the violation if available.91 Criminally, a violation will be
prosecuted if the respondent disobeys the order, and the
petitioner alerts law enforcement, resulting in the respondent’s
arrest.92 If a violation occurs without an arrest, the victim can
87. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND
LAW 541 (Robert C. Clark et al., eds., 2001) (explaining the process for
enforcing a protection order).
88. Id.
89. See OR. JUD. DEP’T, WHAT YOU CAN DO WHEN YOUR MULTNOMAH
COUNTY FAMILY ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) RESTRAINING ORDER HAS BEEN
VIOLATED 2–5 (rev. ed. 2010), http://courts.oregon.gov/multnomah/docs/
FamilyCourt/WhatYouCanDoIfYourRestrainingOrderIsViolated.pdf [hereinafter
WHAT YOU CAN DO] (providing a step by step instruction of the process for
punishing a violation of an order for protection in Oregon); A Guide to Protection
Orders, The Court and Community Resources, COLUMBUS CITY ATTORNEY,
http://www.columbuscity attorney.org/prosecution-guidetoprotection.aspx (last
visited Jan. 31, 2014) (listing the steps that will occur in assessing a violation of
a protection order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See WHAT YOU CAN DO, supra note 89 (explaining the process of alerting
law enforcement of a violation and working with them to have the abuser
penalized).
91. Many organizations that protect abused women offer services or online
instructions to assist these women in filling out the civil contempt form. See
END VIOLENT ENCOUNTERS, HOW TO FILE A MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE FOR A
PERSONAL PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATION, http://www.eveinc.org/main/images/
ppo/motiontoshowcause.pdf (providing detailed instructions on how to fill out a
civil contempt form in Michigan). The form is fairly basic, requiring that the
victim show cause that there was a violation and providing the respondent an
opportunity to appear in court to demonstrate why they should not be held in
contempt. See Contempt Citation and Order to Show Cause, STATE OF COLO.,
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=228
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (providing an example of Colorado’s show cause form
for contempt of court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
92. See sources cited supra note 89 (offering instructions on how to report a
violation of a protection order and receive civil and criminal remedies from the
THE
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reach out to local enforcement or the district attorney to report
the violation and start the process for prosecution.93
III. The Injustice of the Current System
A. Disparity in Enforcement
While a protection order is traditionally obtained by one
party against another, the violation of the order does not always
occur in a simple manner where there is only one-sided contact
and abuse. Currently, a violation of a protection order places all
of the emphasis on the abuser’s role in a violation and essentially
ignores the role of the protected party.94 The majority of courts
have found that a protected party’s role in the violation of a
protection order will not be considered, even in cases of mutual
abuse, placing all the blame on the respondent who violated the
order.95 This ignorance of the protected party’s role allows the
victim to use the structure of the order for enticement, rather
than protection, creating an unintended negative penalty for a
respondent who is lured into a violation.
In analyzing mandatory arrest policies, Keith Guzik has
recognized a trend of women intentionally calling their abusers to
court).
93. See sources cited supra note 91 (providing guides on reporting a
violation of a protection order).
94. Many scholars argue that this should always be the case because of the
fragile situation that women are already in by obtaining a protection order. One
author, Sally Goldfarb, specifically looked at situations where a victim was
penalized for her actions in “enticing” her abuser, and characterized this penalty
as inappropriate because of the difficulties the protected party faces. See Sally
F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
1487, 1528–29 (2008) (noting the many penalties that a victim might bear
because of her role in the violation of the protection order).
95. See State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ohio 2003) (illustrating a
situation where there was mutual abuse, sending the male to the hospital with
a fractured elbow, and the female with a bruised nose). There is the possibility
that the woman inflicted these more severe injuries in self-defense, but the facts
are not clear on that issue. Id; see also City of N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744
N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he victim may not be charged as an
aider and abetter in the violation of a TPO by an offender.”).
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lure them into violating the order.96 Guzik quoted one prison
guard stating: “That happens all the time. Girls call a guy over
when a no-contact order is in effect. He comes over and she calls
the cops.”97 The circumstances of this type of violation are
distinctly different from a scenario where the respondent shows
up uninvited and beats the protected party.98 The law needs to
provide a mechanism for handling these violations where the
woman’s role in the violation cannot and should not go unnoticed.
This problem of disparate treatment also arises where the
parties have reconciled, no abuse has occurred, the parties have
not sought legal assistance, and yet, the respondent is still
charged with a violation. For example, in May of 1998, Frank and
Laura Bullington were pulled over for a routine traffic violation
and upon identification of the passengers the police realized that
Laura had a protection order against her husband.99 Not knowing
the rules and procedures for protection orders, the police arrested
both passengers for violation of the order.100 Eventually, the court
convicted Frank for violating the protection order, but found the
wife could not be charged with violating the protection order as
an aider and abetter.101 Here, a violation resulted without a
report of abuse, and without either party complaining, but only
the respondent was penalized for the reconciliation of the
parties.102 Without a legal option to assess these types of
violations, the court system is neglecting to understand the
circumstances that lead to the violation and the culpability of the
parties involved.

96. See GUZIK, supra note 38, at 44 (exploring the consequences of
mandatory arrest policies and their reliance on gender stereotypes).
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. The illustrations at the beginning of this Note provide another example
of a situation where enforcing the violation would conflict with the purpose of
the order. Supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text.
99. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d at 1225.
100. Id. at 1226.
101. See id. at 1229 (“Here, the victim of a TPO is a member of the protected
class designated for protection from violent abusers. Consequently, the victim
may not be charged as an aider and abetter in the violation of a TPO by an
offender.”).
102. Id.
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A violation of a protection order is a serious offense that can
result in severe penalties for the respondent.103 While the penalty
is justified in the majority of cases, there is the small minority of
cases where courts place the blame on the respondent for
procedural reasons, rather than the culpability of the individuals.
B. The Rationale Behind the Protection
The primary reason for refusing to consider the role of the
woman in violating a protection order is rooted in the woman’s
vulnerable mental state in an abusive relationship.104 Lenore
Walker’s theory on the cycle of abuse highlights the fragile state
of an abused woman, which divides an abusive relationship into
three stages: “the tension building phase; the explosive or acute
battering incident; and the calm loving respite.”105 This cycle
illustrates the battered woman’s belief that her abuser is going to
get better, giving her motivation to remain in the abusive
relationship because of the periods of the cycle where he acts
affectionately.106 This cycle argues that once a man beats his wife,
it will almost always happen again, resulting in continued abuse
and manipulation of the battered woman.107
In the case of Stevenson v. Stevenson,108 the court relied on
this pattern of abuse as the reason for denying a victim’s request
103. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (noting that the typical
criminal penalty for a violation is a misdemeanor, with some states considering
the violation a felony).
104. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55–70 (1979) (explaining
the cycle of violence and the fragile physical and psychological state that women
are in).
105. Id. at 55.
106. See id. at 69 (describing a woman’s tendency to want to continue the
relationship based on the one phase of the cycle where her abuser treats her
with love and respect).
107. See id. (“Most women report that before they know it, the calm, loving
behavior gives away to little battering incidents again.”); see also Stevenson v.
Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998) (“A period of relative calm may
last as long as several months, but in a battering relationship the affection and
contrition of the batterer will eventually fade, and phases one and two, the
‘tension-building’ phase and the ‘acute battering incident’ phase, will start
anew.”).
108. 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998) (finding that reconciliation of the
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to remove an order she had received against her abuser.109 The
court announced that “[a] period of relative calm may last as long
as several months, but in a battering relationship the affection
and contrition of the batterer will eventually fade, and phases one
and two, the ‘tension-building’ phase and the ‘acute battering
incident’ phase, will start anew.”110 The court then rejected the
petitioner’s request because the court found that the likelihood of
further abuse was too great to allow the petitioner to re-enter the
relationship.111
Due to the vulnerable relationship that abusive couples face,
it is not uncommon that both parties will want to reconcile.112 If
the parties choose to do so, they must receive a formal order from
the court to remove the preexisting protection order before they
should take too many steps in continuing their relationship.113 If
the court decides to remove the protection order, the parties can
legally reunite; however, if the court decides not to remove the
order, the parties will be prevented from reconciling.114 For
couple is not sufficient to merit the removal of an order for protection).
109. See id.
When considering a victim’s application to dissolve, and whether
there is good cause to do so, a court must determine whether objective
fear can be said to continue to exist, and also whether there is a real
danger of domestic violence recurring, in the event the restraining
order is dissolved.
110. Id. at 993.
111. See id. (finding that a protection order could not be removed because of
“the uncontroverted evidence of defendant’s brutality against his wife, his
history of violence both within and without the domestic arena, [and] his alcohol
abuse and uncontrolled assaultive behavior when under the influence . . . .”).
112. See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and
Understanding? Restorative Justice As a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence
Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 552–61 (2010) (looking at how
reconciliation of a couple can be used to the advantage of the domestic violence
prevention system).
113. See Robert F. Friedman, Protecting Victims from Themselves, but Not
Necessarily from Abusers: Issuing a No-Contact Order over the Objection of the
Victim Spouse, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235, 245 (2010) (“Prior to the
expiration of the order . . . the party protected by the order may petition the
court to vacate the order.”).
114. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998)
(finding that the dissolution of an order of protection is up to the discretion of
the judge and refusing to remove the order even after the petitioner requested
dissolution); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring
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example, in the case of Stevenson, the court refused a victim’s
petition to remove an order of protection in order for the court to
protect the victim from further abuse, even though she was the
one who petitioned for the removal of the order.115
Even without reconciliation, the precarious state of an
abusive relationship makes it difficult for an abuser to resist the
persistent contact that a victim might initiate; the abuser may
reconnect with the victim and fully intend to cease abusing her,
but the abusive behavior may still recommence.116 The abusers in
these situations do not deserve to go unpenalized, but they do
deserve a proper hearing that places some emphasis on the role
that the victim played in provoking a violation.117
IV. The Legal System’s Approach to the Problem
The woman’s role in violating a protection order has not gone
unnoticed in the legal community, but there is no consensus on
exactly what type of judicial weight should be given to her
the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 44 (2007) (“The quasi-criminal nature of CPOs, as
compared with traditional civil injunctions, may cause a judge to take a more
interventionist, rather than deferential, approach.”).
115. See Stevenson, 714 A.2d at 995 (“This court will not be an accomplice to
further violence by this defendant, by wholly dissolving at this point the
restraints that have been entered against him. Accordingly, and for lack of good
cause shown, plaintiff’s application to dissolve the Final Restraining Order is
denied.”).
116. See WALKER, supra note 104, at 55–70 (describing the cycle of abuse
where a loving relationship turns violent without provocation).
117. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1528–29 (describing some court’s
decisions to consider the woman’s role in the violation, resulting in women being
“charged as accessories for ‘enticing’ the abuser to violate the order; [and] . . .
such contact [being] considered . . . a mitigating factor when sentencing the
abuser on a criminal charge”). Much of the discretion in how to enforce a
protection order is still left to the judge, and some judges have decided to take it
into their own hands when they feel that a woman deserves to be penalized for
her actions in communicating with her abuser. See Francis X. Clines, Judge’s
Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2002, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/08/us/judge-sdomestic-violence-ruling-creates-an-outcry-in-kentucky.html
(recounting a
judge’s decision to fine two victims of domestic abuse for ignoring the protection
orders they had received against their abusers).
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continued contact with her abuser. In Diane Kiesel’s casebook
entitled Domestic Violence: Law, Policy, and Practice, she
recognizes the problem in weighing the woman’s role in the
violation, but does not provide a solution.118 Kiesel asks the
question: “[S]hould a judicial sanction be imposed where a victim
invites her abuser to ignore the protective order and is
subsequently injured or abused at his hands?”119 Both law
enforcement and the court system have asked this same question,
but there is no single answer to how the victim’s role in the
violation should be treated.
Some states have attempted to answer this question by
recognizing and penalizing the woman for her role in the
respondent’s violation of a protection order in four ways:
(1) charging the woman as an aider and abetter in the
violation;120 (2) rendering the order null because of
reconciliation;121 (3) fining the woman for her continued contact
with the abuser; 122 and (4) issuing mutual protection orders.123
The next subparts will look at the application of these methods,
and some of the criticism surrounding them.
A. The Protected Party as an Aider and Abetter
Only a few state courts have addressed the issue of whether
a petitioner can be charged as an aider and abetter in the
violation of an order protecting her. In Henley v. Iowa District
Court for Emmet County,124 the court determined that the
petitioner’s decision to hide her abuser in her bedroom was too
118. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 172 (examining some of the issues that
are raised by protection orders in the criminal context of the law).
119. Id.
120. Infra Part IV.A.
121. Infra Part IV.B.
122. Infra Part IV.C.
123. Infra Part IV.D.
124. 533 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1995). In Henley, the court found that a
petitioner in a protection order can be held in contempt of court for assisting her
abuser in violating a no-contact order. Id. at 199. Henley was then arrested and
held in contempt for violating the order, and later was put on probation for six
months. Id.
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egregious for her to go unpenalized.125 The violation of the order
occurred after police officers noticed the abuser’s car outside of
Henley’s house, and went to her door to ensure that everything
was okay.126 The police officers then conducted a search of the
home and found Henley’s abuser “under some blankets in the
bedroom.”127 This Iowa court determined that Henley was an
accomplice to the violation, and found her in contempt of court for
her actions.128 Here, the court recognized the need to protect the
victim of domestic abuse, but also recognized that this victim’s
actions could not go ignored simply because she was previously
the victim.129 The court stated, “[a]lthough we are sympathetic to
Henley’s plight as a victim, her willful disregard for her own
safety cannot deter us from upholding an enforceable order for
her protection.”130 This statement highlights the Judiciary’s
refusal to ignore the actions of the victim in causing a violation of
an order.131
Other state courts have taken the opposite approach,
explicitly rejecting the idea of penalizing the petitioner.132 In
State v. Lucas,133 an Ohio court decided that the protected party
is immune from prosecution for complicity.134 The court looked at
the legislative intent of the statute, and determined that “[t]he
General Assembly has made an invitation by the petitioner for
the respondent to violate the terms of a protection order
irrelevant to a respondent’s guilt.”135 The court recognized that
the protected party actually inflicted more damage on her

125. Id.
126. Id. at 201.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 203.
131. Id.
132. See State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 648 (Ohio 2003) (finding that a
petitioner can never be convicted of aiding and abetting in the violation of her
own order).
133. 795 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 2003).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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husband than she herself was subject to,136 but determined that
this fact was irrelevant because of the need to protect the more
typical situations, where the victim suffers more harm.137
Moreover, Ohio’s state statute goes even further by explicitly
stating that “the [protection order] cannot be waived or nullified
by an invitation to the respondent from the petitioner or other
family or household member to enter the residence.”138
Ohio is not alone in its refusal to penalize the victim as an
aider and abetter in a protection order violation. Indiana courts
have also determined that an individual cannot be found to have
aided and abetted in the violation of an order that was
established for her own protection.139 Because protection orders
are independently governed by each state’s legislature, these
differences in state penalties can create problems when the
protected party crosses state lines.140 Additionally, charging the
victim as an aider and abetter is one of the most controversial
aspects of protection orders because of the possible chilling effect
it could have on the victim reporting the abuse, creating the risk
of the protection order being deemed useless.141

136. See id. at 647–48 (“[T]his case is different from most. Had Betty Lucas
not gotten the better of her husband, this case would probably not be here.”).
137. See id. at 647 (finding that in a typical protection order violation, the
“protected party receives the brunt of the injuries”).
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(7)(a) (West 2012).
139. See Patterson v. State, No. 34A02–1203–CR–235, 2012 WL 6478364, at
*3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2012) (finding that the general assembly did not
intend for the petitioner to be held in violation of the order, even if she invited
the respondent to come into contact); Dixon v. State, 869 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e do not consider whether the victim knowingly ignored the
protective order but, rather, whether the defendant knowingly violated the
protective order. The protective order is between [the abuser] and the State, not
[the abuser] and [the victim].”).
140. See infra Part V.D (explaining how protection orders are enforced when
a protected party crosses state lines).
141. See Adam Liptak, Ohio Case Considers Whether Abuse Victim Can
Violate Own Protective Order, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A18 (quoting
Cleveland lawyer Alexandria M. Ruden as stating, “[t]his would have an
absolute chilling effect on domestic violence victims going to the police and going
to prosecutors” when asked about the effect of a victim being charged with
aiding and abetting her abuser in violating the order).
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B. Reconciliation of the Parties

Some courts looked to remedy the problem by considering the
reconciliation of the parties as grounds to nullify an existing
order. In Mohamed v. Mohamed,142 a New Jersey appellate court
found that, “[t]he reconciliation of the parties destroys the
viability of a domestic violence order” because the parties have
settled the matter themselves outside the boundaries of the
law.143
Although this decision occurred before the passage of New
Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,144 which
enhanced the power of law enforcement and the judiciary,145 New
Jersey has continued to use reconciliation as a consideration in
determining whether a protection order violation has occurred.146
In the later New Jersey case, Carfagno v. Carfagno,147 the court
created eleven factors that can be considered in determining
whether a respondent’s request for dissolution of a protection
order should be granted.148 The factors are:
(1) whether the victim consented to lift the restraining order;
(2) whether the victim fears the defendant; (3) the nature of
142. 555 A.2d 696 (N.J. App. Div. 1989). In Mohamed, the court determined
that a protection order was void because “the domestic violence action [was]
resolved by the parties, [and] the reconciliation should end the matter[, because
t]he reconciliation of the parties destroys the viability of a domestic violence
order.” Id. at 698.
143. Id.
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 (West 1991).
145. See A.B. v. L.M., 672 A.2d 1296, 1298 (N.J. App. Div. 1996) (“[T]he law
of domestic violence was substantially revised with the passage of the 1991 Act.
Police and judicial responsibilities were enhanced . . . .”).
146. See 12 N.J. PRAC., FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 47.21 (“A victim who
reconciles with a defendant adjudicated of having committed domestic violence,
by resuming their pre-complaint relationship, generally destroys the viability of
a restraining order and serves as a de facto vacation of the order.”).
147. 672 A.2d 751 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1995). The court in Carfagno did not
dissolve the protection order pursuant to the defendant’s petition. See id. at 760
(applying eleven factors for determining whether a protection order should be
dissolved per a defendant’s petitioner and finding that the protection order
should not be dissolved in this case).
148. See id. at 756–57 (noting that the factors for consideration “need to be
weighed qualitatively, and not quantitatively, to determine whether defendant
has met the required burden”).
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the relationship between the parties today; (4) the number of
times that the defendant has been convicted of contempt for
violating the order; (5) whether the defendant has a continuing
involvement with drug or alcohol abuse; (6) whether the
defendant has been involved in other violent acts with other
persons; (7) whether the defendant has engaged in counseling;
(8) the age and health of the defendant; (9) whether the victim
is acting in good faith when opposing the defendant’s request;
(10) whether another jurisdiction has entered a restraining
order protecting the victim from the defendant; and (11) other
factors deemed relevant by the court.149

This test allows New Jersey’s courts to take a complete
survey of the relationship between the abuser and the protected
party when assessing the removal of the order.150 Additionally,
this test allows the respondent to petition the court to have an
order removed if he feels that the two parties have reconciled and
should be able to continue their relationship.151 With this test, the
couple can come back into contact, reconcile, and petition the
court without the respondent violating the protection order.152
149. Id. Other New Jersey decisions have created factors to consider before
granting a petition for dissolution because of reconciliation. The factors used in
Torres v. Lancellotti include:
1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and
defendant; . . . 2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
property; 3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
defendant; 4) The best interests of the victim and any child; 5) In
determining custody and visitation the protection of the victim’s
safety; and 6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from
another jurisdiction, as well as any proof of changed circumstances
since the entry of the order.
Torres v. Lancellotti, 607 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1992).
150. See Carfango, 672 A.2d at 756–57 (providing the test for reconciliation
in New Jersey).
151. See id. (noting that this test allows the defendant to petition the court
for relief as long as he can satisfy the requirements of the test).
152. This will help prevent a violation from occurring in situations where no
abuse was reported, but a violation occurred because of the specific
circumstances. For example, in the case of Laura and Frank Bullington, neither
party complained of abuse, rather a police officer discovered the protection order
when he had the respondent pulled over for a routine traffic violation. City of N.
Olmstead v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d 1225, 1225 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). Or, in the
example where the police officers simply noticed the respondent’s car outside of
the petitioner’s house and went inside to ensure that everything was okay.
Henley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Emmet Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa 1995).
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The test does not remove the possibility of a violation, but instead
provides a specific method for removing the protection order with
a proper showing of reconciliation and a rehabilitated
relationship.153
C. Fining the Protected Party
Another approach to remedying the problem of victim
enticement is to fine the petitioner for her continued contact with
her abuser. In one Kentucky court the judge did just that, fining
two women who had taken out protection orders against their
abusers and then continued to contact them in violation of the
order.154 The women were fined the small amounts of $100 and
$200, but the point of the fine was to signal to the women that
they could not continue to contact their abuser and go
unpenalized.155 The judge was experienced in the domestic abuse
docket, and was sick of seeing women who “awake . . . her at 2
a.m. with pleas for emergency orders. And then, within days . . .
[come] back in her court—arm in arm with the men they say they
fear.”156
This Kentucky court is not the only court that has become fed
up with petitioners’ tendencies to reconnect with their abusers. In
North Carolina courts, “some judges have taken to charging
women a $65 fee if they apply for a protective order then decide to
drop the matter.”157 The courts argue that the fine forces women
to seriously consider the consequences of filing a protection order,
rather than petitioning for an order one day and dropping the
order the next. In reality, this type of fine creates a substantial
153. See Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751, 760 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1995)
(providing the test for reconciliation in New Jersey).
154. See Clines, supra note 117 (“‘You can’t have it both ways,’ said Judge
Megan Lake Thornton of Fayette County District Court in recently fining two
women $100 and $200 respectively for obtaining protective orders forbidding
their partners from contacting them, then relenting and contacting the men.”).
155. Id.
156. Stephanie Simon, Judges Push for Abused to Follow the Law, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/22/news/mn-24141
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
157. Id.
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disincentive to petitioning for a protection order, and would be
extremely detrimental to women who are in a manipulative
relationship and are unsure about how to seek relief. In contrast
to the fines that the Kentucky judge imposed after the protected
party came back into contact with her abuser,158 this type of fine
penalizes the victim before she has done anything deserving of a
penalty.159
These fines assessed against the protected party have
created a strong push from domestic violence advocates to ban
these types of penalties.160 Although the Kentucky judge saw no
excuse for the women’s actions, advocates for abused women
argue that it is not so easy for a woman to simply cut off all
contact with her abuser, and situational factors complicate the
party’s prior reliance on each other.161 The executive director of
the Kentucky Domestic Violence Association argued that simply
cutting off all contact is impossible because “[t]hey may have
children in common. It’s pretty hard to say, ‘Never speak again.’
People have financial difficulties. They may love the partner. It’s
not an easy thing.”162 But, this argument only supports
communications by the victim that have a legitimate purpose—
such as arranging child visitation or bill payment—this does not
justify communication by the victim that is wrongfully used to
entice the respondent into a violation.
Additionally, these arguments made by battered women
advocates can be easily applied in the reverse direction. When the
respondent has cut off all contact with the petitioner, he is going
to have to deal with the same problems of reliance and

158. See text supra note 154 (assessing fines on women who continued to
contact their abusers after they received protection orders against the men).
159. See text supra note 157 (noting that one court charges a $65 fee when a
petitioner chooses to drop her petition for a protection order).
160. See Clines, supra note 117 (“Judge Thornton’s ruling has alarmed
advocates for battered women, who plan to appeal it. The advocates say the
finding goes beyond existing law. . . .”).
161. See id. (finding Judge Thorton’s actions “unrealistic because some
renewed contacts often prove unavoidable in domestic abuse cases, which
involve economic and family dependency and other complications of daily
living”).
162. Simon, supra note 156.
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dependence that the female is facing.163 If the petitioner is
continuing to contact her abuser without penalty, the difficulty is
amplified, complicating the respondent’s efforts to ignore her
constant communication.164 Although ending communication is
difficult, if the party who took the proactive step of petitioning for
the protection order is simply communicating to entice a violation
from the respondent, the protection order is transformed from a
device that protects the victim into a tool that can be used for
retribution.
D. Issuing a Mutual Protection Order
Another legal method for coping with the problem of
enticement in protection orders is to issue a mutual protection
order (mutual order), prohibiting both parties from
communicating with each other.165 These orders prevent the
woman from enticing her abuser because both parties bear a
penalty for violating the order if they come into contact, meaning
she will be in violation of the order as soon as she reaches out to
the respondent.166
1. Obtaining a Mutual Protection Order
Mutual orders come in three main forms: (1) mutual
petitioning and abuse; (2) mutual finding of abuse without a
separate petition; and (3) agreement for a mutual order without a
finding of abuse or separate petition. The first form arises when
both parties petition the court for a protection order, presenting
163. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (describing the
difficulties in completely cutting off communication between the couple).
164. See supra note 161 (explaining the domestic advocate’s argument that
completely ending contact with an abuser is too difficult for the typical battered
woman).
165. See Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of
Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q.
253, 266 (1996) (“A mutual protection order is an order entered against both
parties, requiring both to abide by the restraints and other forms of relief in the
civil protection order.”).
166. Id.
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evidence of abuse committed by both parties, and the court later
issuing an order that prevents either party from making
contact.167 The second form occurs when one party has petitioned
the court for an order of protection, but during the trial and
presentation of facts there is a finding of abuse from both parties,
resulting in the judge issuing a mutual protection order without a
petition from both parties.168 The last method arises when the
victim simply agrees to a mutual order to stay away from the
abuser, even without a showing of abuse.169 This last form often
seems the most appealing to the victim at the time but can result
in the harshest penalties for the victim in the long run because
she submits herself to civil and criminal liability without having
committed any abuse.170
Many states have chosen to explicitly prohibit mutual
orders,171 only issuing a mutual order when both parties have
167. See Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective
Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protection Orders are Not, 67 IND.
L.J. 1039, 1053–54 (1992) (explaining the process available for attaining a
mutual order).
168. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(18) (2012) (stating that a mutual
order can be issued if both parties have met their burden of showing abuse and
the court makes separate findings of fact supporting the issuance of the order);
MASS. GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 209A, § 3 (2012) (“A court may issue a mutual
restraining order or mutual no-contact order pursuant to any abuse prevention
action only if the court has made specific written findings of fact.”).
169. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 44 (1991) (“[R]ather than face
custody suits, women accept mutual orders of protection, which are
inappropriate if the woman has not been violent and can hinder the
effectiveness of the protective order.”); Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1053 (“Like
other civil cases, protection orders can be negotiated or ‘settled.’ Battered wives
can agree to mutual protection orders if they wish.”). This type of mutual order
has been argued as hindering the effectiveness of the order because a woman
may be less likely to report an incident of the respondent abusing her because of
her fear that she will be held in violation of the order as well. Id.
170. See Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1055 (“[V]ictims do not often oppose
[mutual] orders. They will agree to a mutual order for several reasons. They
may want to expedite the process, cooperate with the lawyer and the judge, and
avoid violent reactions from their abusers.”).
171. See A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STATES PERMITTING OR
PROHIBITING MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS WITHOUT A SEPARATE PETITION (2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Prohibiting
MutualProtectiveOrdersJuly2007.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter
STATES
PERMITTING MUTUAL PROTECTION ORDERS] (listing California, Colorado, Idaho,
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separately petitioned the court for relief.172 In contrast, some
states still allow mutual orders to be entered without a petition
for relief if the judge determines both parties acted as the
aggressor.173 For example, Maryland allows mutual orders “if the
judge makes a detailed finding of fact that . . . both parties acted
primarily as aggressors; and . . . neither party acted primarily in
self-defense.”174 Currently, nine states allow mutual orders,
twelve states are silent on mutual orders, and thirty states
expressly prohibit mutual orders without a separate petition.175
2. The Problems with Mutual Protection Orders
Previously, mutual orders were used as a common tool for
preventing abuse,176 but significant scholarship and research has
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Washington as offering some form of a mutual protection order).
172. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/215 (2012) (“Mutual orders of protection are
prohibited.”); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-14 (2012) (“A court may not grant a mutual
order for protection to opposing parties.”); IOWA CODE § 236.20 (2012) (“A court
in an action under this chapter shall not issue mutual protective orders against
the victim and the abuser unless both file a petition requesting a protective
order.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2012) (“No protection from abuse order
shall be entered against the plaintiff unless: (1) The defendant properly files a
written cross or counter petition seeking such a protection order.”); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.735 (West 2011) (“A court may issue mutual protective orders
only if a separate petition is filed by the respondent.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A,
§ 4007 (2012) (“The court may not issue a mutual order of protection or
restraint.”).
173. See STATES PERMITTING MUTUAL PROTECTION ORDERS, supra note 171
(providing which states allow mutual orders).
174. MD. CODE. ANN, Fam. Law § 4-506 (2012); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 39-6306 (2012) (“In providing relief under this chapter, the court may realign
the designation of the parties as ‘petitioner’ and ‘respondent’ where the court
finds that the original petitioner is the abuser and the original respondent is the
victim of domestic violence.”).
175. See STATES PERMITTING MUTUAL PROTECTION ORDERS, supra note 171
(providing which states allow mutual orders).
176. Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith
and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of
Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 839–40 (2004) (“Previously, it had
been common practice for some courts to issue ‘mutual’ protection orders that
required both parties to stay away from each other and adhere to other
conditions without making any findings of fact or even requiring the respondent
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illustrated the negative effects that the orders have on the
petitioner, creating a shift away from their use.177 One of the
strongest arguments against mutual protection orders is the due
process concern inherent in a mutual protection order.178
Elizabeth Topliffe has argued that mutual protection orders
violate due process because the woman’s right to be free from
unnecessary restraint is infringed when a judge issues a mutual
order without a mutual showing of abuse.179 Another argument
against mutual orders is the placement of blame on the victims of
abuse, which can create issues of further abuse because the
abuser feels that the court has justified his actions by penalizing
the victim.180 Lastly, because of the lack of evidence necessary to
issue a mutual order, it is believed that they can be issued hastily
and without discretion, resulting in the woman’s rights being
restricted unnecessarily.181 These procedural and social concerns
to file a petition against the original petitioner.”).
177. See, e.g., Jennifer P. Hanft, What’s Really the Problem with Mutual
Protection Orders, WYO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 23 (arguing that mutual protection
orders are more dangerous than having no order at all); Phillips, supra note 80,
at 34–36 (examining the many drawbacks related to mutual protection orders);
Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1053–64 (looking at the negative repercussions of
mutual protection orders).
178. See Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1056–60 (describing the probability that
mutual protection orders violate due process and citing state court decisions
that have found a violation of due process).
179. See id. at 1060 (“[J]udges and lawyers must educate themselves
regarding the procedural due process issues implicated by mutual protection
orders. Once lawyers and judges become educated they can prevent these
violations of procedural due process.”); see also FitzGerald v. FitzGerald, 406
N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the lower court erred in
issuing a mutual protection order when there was no evidence of abuse on the
part of the petitioner); Deacon v. Landers, 587 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (holding that appellant was denied due process when a mutual order was
issued against her without providing her an opportunity to cross examine or
present evidence).
180. See Phillips, supra note 80, at 35 (“[T]he issuance of a mutual order of
protection without specific findings may imply to an already troubled victim
that he or she was partially at fault for the abuse. A mutual order of protection
may also bolster an abuser’s belief that he is not at fault.”).
181. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer: Society’s
Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 990
(2011) (describing mutual orders as “highly controversial because they may be
issued hastily and without evidence, or may restrict parties who were merely
violent in self-defense”).
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regarding mutual orders have produced a general aversion to
mutual orders, preventing them from being an adequate solution
to the problem of unjust enforcement of protection orders.182
V. Preventing the Victim from Enticing Her Abuser
While some states are using these legal options to provide a
barrier to unjust enforcement, the legal system can do more to
protect these men who do not always deserve punishment for
their actions.183 The previous approaches are not applied with
any consistency, failing to notify both the petitioner and
respondent of what the repercussions of their actions might be. A
more unified and reliable approach to the rare circumstances
where the respondent is enticed into contact will result in an
equitable result for both parties; preventing the petitioner from
receiving a penalty she did not know existed, and avoiding the
unnecessarily penalization of a blameless respondent.
This subpart proposes three solutions that provide a
circumstantial approach to violations, as opposed to the
automatic punishment system that is currently in place in most
jurisdictions. The proposals are provided in the order of weakest
to strongest, ending with the proposal that is most effective
remedy to the issue of enticement. The first proposal is a uniform
fining system that would discourage the protected party from
contacting their abuser unnecessarily.184 Second, this Note will
propose a mediation system that parties can choose in lieu of
receiving an order for protection.185 While these first two
proposals seem appealing at first glance, the solutions are
actually an ineffective response to the problem posed by this
Note, which will be highlighted when explaining the proposals.186
The third argument is the strongest solution to the problem of
182. See supra note 177 (providing resources that are strongly opposed to
mutual orders and their effect on abused women).
183. See supra Part IV (explaining the existing legal options protecting the
restrained party from being enticed by the petitioner).
184. Infra Part V.A.
185. Infra Part V.B.
186. Infra Part V.A–B.
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victim enticement.187 This subpart advocates for remedying the
problem of enticement at the back end, through the use of a
factor-based approach to protection order violations,188 along with
issuing mutual protection orders once the victim has enticed her
abuser into contact.189 The final subpart of this section will
advocate for uniform application of these rules in order for the
problem of disparate enforcement to be fully addressed.190
A. Implementing a Fining System
The first proposal is to create a fining system that is a
component of each protection order issued that discourages
victims from enticing their abuser back into contact.191 Similar to
Judge Thorton’s sanctions, a fining system would make the
victim aware that she should not be contacting her abuser,
without imposing too severe of a penalty on the victim.192 Fining
the victim for repeated contact is not an uncommon occurrence in
the court system, but because no state includes this penalty in
their statutes for protection orders, the penalty usually comes up
without the victim knowing that she had done anything that
could be penalized.193
With the application of this penalty, along with a process for
informing the petitioner of the possible fine, a victim would be
less likely to contact her abuser for mere enticement purposes,
and would be able to work towards ending communication with
187. Infra Part V.C.
188. Infra Part V.C.1.
189. Infra Part V.C.2.
190. Infra Part V.D.
191. This penalty may implicate some of the same arguments that are made
against mutual orders, primarily that the victim is being penalized without
having done anything. See supra Part IV.D.2 (noting some of the criticisms of
mutual orders and their negative impact on victims of domestic violence).
192. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text (providing Judge
Thorton’s decision to fine two victims of domestic violence for continuing to
contact their abuser).
193. See supra Part IV.C (providing examples of judges that have fined the
victim of a protection order because of their continued contact with their
abuser).
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her abuser all together. To avoid too severe of a penalty, a system
could be imposed where the fine does not result until the
respondent has provided evidence that the petitioner has
contacted him more than once.
This solution is the weakest proposal because it brings up
some of the arguments that are made against treating the victim
as an aider and abetter194 or penalizing the respondent by
issuing a mutual protection order.195 Many advocates for
battered women are strongly opposed to the victim being
penalized for any of her actions because she is not the party who
committed the abuse in the first place, and creating this later
penalty discourages the battered woman from seeking
protection.196 Although some jurisdictions have already
implemented this type of monetary penalty, another option that
does not place blame on the petitioner would be more accepted
by the legal community.197
B. Providing Mediation Rather than an Order
Protection orders frequently end because the parties involved
decide to reconcile. This reconciliation often results because the
woman never wanted to have a complete prohibition on contact
with her abuser, but obtained the protection order in an effort to
end the abuse.198 The majority of courts refuse to allow couples in
abusive relationships to have it both ways, meaning they are not
going to step in to police the relationship, and still allow the

194. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (arguing that charging the
victim as an aider and abetter in a violation would have a chilling effect on
victims seeking relief).
195. See supra Part IV.D.2 (highlighting the negative effects of mutual
orders including due process concerns and the risk that the victim will feel that
her abuser’s actions are justified).
196. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (arguing that a woman
should not be penalized for any contact she might make with her abuser because
of her precarious mental and physical state).
197. Supra note 157.
198. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1512 (explaining the difficulty in
maintaining a couple’s relationship once a domestic abuse charge occurs).
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couple to live together.199 Because of this approach, a woman who
simply wants a prohibition on further abuse—rather than ending
the relationship—may not be able to do so; and is forced to obtain
a protection order completely barring contact.200 In a Wisconsin
study designed to determine victim satisfaction with protection
orders, the protection orders issued against the victim’s wishes
were more likely to be violated by the victims themselves than
the orders where the victim was supportive.201 If a woman does
not support the order she obtains, she is unlikely to stop
contacting her abuser, possibly leading to the types of provoked
violations that this Note addresses.
In contrast to simply issuing an order of protection, many
scholars have argued that mediation provides a legal alternative
that is beneficial to both parties in working to end the abuse,
without completely ending the relationship.202 The Mediation and
Restorative Justice Centre, located in Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada has been developing a mediation program that works to
protect the victim while facilitating the best result for the couple
as a whole.203 The mediation process is divided into three steps,
199. See id. at 1550 (explaining the court’s trend towards dissolving a
relationship rather than working to fix the relationship for the benefit of both
parties); see also Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998)
(refusing to grant the victim’s request that a protection order be removed, even
when she was the one petitioning the court for removal).
200. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1505 (“[A] battered woman who wants
to obtain a protection order designed to end the violence but not the relationship
may be unable to do so.”).
201. See id. at 1512 (“According to the Wisconsin study, women were at
higher risk for non-compliance with the protection order if they did not want to
end the relationship or were ambivalent about it. Much of the non-compliance
took the form of violations of prohibitions on contact.”).
202. See Lauren K. Williams, The Use of Mediation as a Complement to the
Integrated Domestic Violence Courts of New York, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 713, 737 (2012) (“[M]any victims have been frustrated with the process
of seeking an order of protection and the public nature of the courtroom
experience, and might be interested in mediation, if it was an option.”).
203. See ALAN EDWARDS & JENNIFER HASLETT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE 1 (2003), http://www.voma.org/
docs/DVandRJPaper2003.pdf (“The Victim Offender Mediation (VOM) program
of the Mediation and Restorative Justice Centre (MRJC) . . . has been
conducting restorative dialogue sessions with domestic violence victims and
offenders since 1998.”); see also Williams, supra note 202, at 723–24 (explaining
the process that is used in the Centre’s domestic violence mediation program).
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allowing the greatest protection for the victim and the possibility
of a positive outcome.204 The steps consist of: (1) an independent
meeting with each party “in order to determine that the
mediation can be done safely;” (2) a meeting where both parties
are present to discuss the problems facing the couple, and a
solution is reached; and (3) a second series of independent
meetings to ensure that both parties are independently happy
with the results of the mediation.205
This process provides a remedy for victims who want to
maintain their relationship with their abuser, but need a legal
mechanism to prevent the abuse from continuing.206 A protection
order provides a limited number of legal remedies that are not
always tailored to the victim’s needs; in contrast, many scholars
argue that “mediation allows the parties to structure the
solutions themselves and to create solutions that would be
unavailable through the court process.”207 If the parties are
unable to reach an agreement in the mediation session provided,
the victim still has the option of appearing in court to receive a
formal protection order to prevent further abuse.208
While these scholars and the Mediation and Restorative
Justice Centre have worked to make mediation a viable option,
this is an unrealistic approach to attacking abuse in the United
States. Specifically, scholars have noted the extreme unreliability
that mediation provides a couple in an abusive relationship,209
and the extensive levels of training and enforcement that would
be required by this type of system.210 Even advocates who support
204. Williams, supra note 202, at 723.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 724 (“Victims may not want their abusers go to jail or leave
the home they share; such measures are the two most common punishments
meted by the courts. The parties’ perception as to what will work best for them
may differ from the judge’s perspective . . . .”).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 730–32 (providing the multistep process that should be used
to determine whether victims should mediate or choose another legal route).
209. See Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and
Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of Creating Effective Screens, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 53, 58 (2005) (explaining the difficulty in constructing screens to keep
certain abusive relationships out of mediation).
210. See Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence
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the use of mediation have noted that “[v]ictims of domestic
violence who have experienced a ‘culture of battering’ . . .
characterized by forms of physical, emotional, sexual, familial
and/or financial abuse . . . are in virtually all instances, not
appropriate candidates for mediation.”211 Because of the volatile
relationship between abusive couples, mediation will likely only
provide a temporary remedy, with inevitable relapse in many
scenarios. If the court is going to intervene into an abusive
relationship, it cannot afford to adopt a system that has a high
possibility of relapse, leaving the woman in a vulnerable position
for additional abuse.
Additionally, scholars against the use of mediation have
highlighted that “[m]ediation is never considered . . . in criminal
cases. Therefore it should not be considered in domestic violence
cases.”212 Because of the protection order’s character as a civil
remedy with criminal penalties, the approach that is used in
criminal cases should be equally applied to the civil realm of a
protection order.213 While mediation seems appealing at first
glance, the unreliability of the protection that is provided is not
an effective solution to the problem of victim enticement.
C. Providing a Remedy at the Back End of Enticement
1. A Factor-Based Approach
Another solution to the problem of unjust enforcement is to
create a factor-based approach to assessing violations of an order.
This approach would allow the court to consider the
circumstances leading to the violation, helping to prevent the
Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 259 (2002) (“Due to poor screening for
domestic violence, the absence of legislative mandates for mediator training,
and the inevitable re-privatization of domestic violence which will set back the
legislative progress achieved by the battered women’s movement, mediation
continues to be an inadequate response to family issues.”).
211. Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 209, at 58.
212. Laurel Wheeler, Mandatory Family Mediation and Domestic Violence,
26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 559, 572 (2002).
213. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (noting that a protection
order has both civil and criminal penalties).
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type of disparity in enforcement that was illustrated by Eric
Nolen’s and Mark Hunt’s cases at the beginning of this Note.214
Similar to the test used in Carfagno v. Carfagno, the courts
would apply this test when assessing a protection order violation,
allowing the court to consider not only the positive circumstances
of the violation, but also any negative factors that should be
considered, such as the history of violations and abuse.215 With
this type of test, cases where the restrained party contacted the
protected party out of necessity—such as having to take her to
the hospital—would not necessarily be penalized because the
circumstances of the violation would be considered in assessing
the penalty.216
Many states already have a system of mitigating and
aggravating factors in their criminal system that are used when
assessing what penalty will be imposed once an individual has
been convicted of a certain crime.217 These factors are applied
differently in each state, but they allow the court to consider the
circumstances surrounding the crime when determining the
proper penalty for the defendant.218 For example, under South
Carolina’s factors for mitigation of criminal sexual conduct, the
court considers: the defendant’s prior history; the defendant’s
state of mind; whether the defendant was under duress or
214. See supra Part I (providing two illustrations of violations of protection
orders that arose from very different circumstances).
215. See Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751, 760 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1995)
(applying eleven factors for determining whether a protection order should be
dissolved per a defendant’s petition and finding that the protection order should
not be dissolved in this case).
216. See State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App.
2012) (finding Mark Hunt violated the protection order his wife had against him
for driving her to the hospital when she had pneumonia).
217. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors for Kidnapping, 0030
SURVEYS 29 (Westlaw) (providing references for each state’s factors that are
considered when sentencing an individual for kidnapping); Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors for Sex Crimes, 0030 SURVEYS 31 (Westlaw) (providing
references for each state’s factors that are considered when sentencing an
individual for sexual assault).
218. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors for Kidnapping, supra note 217
(“Jurisdictions vary on how aggravating and mitigating factors are applied (i.e.:
moving the sentence within an already defined statutory high and low or
allowing the sentence to move beyond the scope of the statutorily mandated
range).”).
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domination by another person; and factors that would reduce the
defendant’s level of culpability.219 These factors easily translate to
the context of protection order violations, and when applied in
conjunction with the factors created by the reconciliation tests,
the current issue of the victim enticing her abuser is
diminished.220
Rather than applying these factors at the sentencing phase of
the hearing, the factors should be applied at the stage when the
court is determining whether the individual has violated the
order in the first place.221 Similar to the defense of consent in
rape cases, these factors would consider the circumstances of the
violation and the role that the victim played in enticing her
abuser into contact.222 Even if the victim was not intentionally
enticing her abuser, the circumstances of her contact may have
made it very difficult for the restrained party to not reach out to
the victim.223 With this factor based approach, a restrained party
219. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2012)
(b) Mitigating circumstances: (i) The defendant has no significant
history of prior criminal convictions involving the use of violence
against another person. (ii) The crime was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance. (iii) The defendant was an accomplice in the crime
committed by another person and his participation was relatively
minor. (iv) The defendant acted under duress or under the
domination of another person. (v) The capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (vi) The age or
mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime. (vii) The
defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
These South Carolina factors are meant to provide a model for the development
of factors for the domestic violence context. In order for this to be applied in the
protection order context, a new set of factors would need to be developed, with
the woman’s role in the violation being one of the necessary considerations.
220. See Carfagno, 672 A.2d at 760 (applying eleven factors for determining
whether a protection order should be dissolved per a defendant’s petition and
finding that the protection order should not be dissolved in this case).
221. See supra notes 217–20 (providing examples of factors that can be
considered in evaluating a protection order violation).
222. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 84 (2013) (explaining how consent works as a
defense to rape).
223. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *1 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2012) (finding Mark Hunt violated the protection order his wife had
against him for driving her to the hospital when she had pneumonia); State v.
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would be able to offer evidence supporting his reason for violating
the order, while still allowing the court to consider any
aggravating factors such as prior incidents of abuse, or
manipulation of the victim.224
2. Issuing Mutual Protection Orders Post-Enticement
Another option for providing a solution after the victim has
been active in contacting her abuser is to provide an option for a
one-sided protection order to be transformed into a mutual
order.225 This remedy would allow the court to create an order
preventing communication from both parties if the court finds
that the victim has been consistently contacting her abuser with
the intent to induce a violation.
This solution removes the due process concern that arises
when a mutual order is issued.226 As discussed previously,
scholars are concerned that the issuance of a mutual order
infringes on a woman’s right to be free from unnecessary
restraint when she did not do anything worthy of punishment.227
When a mutual order is issued after the woman has attempted to
entice her abuser, the woman has been given the opportunity to
be free from restraint, but has lost this option because of her
consistent contact with her abuser in hopes of inducing a
violation. Issuing a mutual order on the back end removes the
problem of inducement, while preventing the unnecessary
punishment of a victim before she has done anything wrong.

Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 642 (Ohio 2003) (noting that the petitioner of the
protection order invited her abuser over to celebrate their mutual son’s
birthday).
224. See supra note 217 (providing examples of mitigating and aggravating
factors in kidnapping and sexual assault cases).
225. See supra Part IV.D.1–2 (explaining a mutual order).
226. See Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1056–60 (arguing that mutual orders
violate due process and citing state court decisions that have found a mutual
order to be a violation of due process).
227. See id. (“[I]ssuing mutual orders without hearing evidence is arguably a
violation of due process, especially when the respondent does not request a
mutual order.”).
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D. Uniform Application of the Remedies
Regardless of the path chosen to remedy the problem of
disparate enforcement, the solution needs to have uniform
application across the states in order to be effective. While there
is the obvious argument for uniform application in order to
provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people,
there is another argument rooted in interstate treatment of
protection orders that is more crucial to the solution. To
understand this argument, it is important to first understand
how full faith and credit is applied to protection orders.
Full faith and credit plays a crucial role in providing
protection to the victim of abuse when she crosses over state
lines. Once a protection order is in place, many victims remain
fearful of their abuser and choose to relocate across state lines to
avoid additional contact with their abuser.228 State law governs
the enforcement of protection orders,229 but federal law ensures
that the order will be given full faith and credit when a victim
decides to make the move across state lines.230 In 1994, Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),231 requiring all
states to give full faith and credit to protection orders issued by
sister states.232 The text of VAWA reads:
Any protection order issued . . . shall be accorded full faith and
credit by the court of another State, Indian tribe, or territory
(the enforcing State, Indian tribe, or territory) and enforced by
the court and law enforcement personnel of the other State,
Indian tribal government or Territory as if it were the order of
the enforcing State or tribe.233
228. See Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a
Battered Women Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 999–
1000 (2007) (“Although some domestic violence agencies disavow the idea of an
‘underground railroad’ for battered women, it is undeniable that women flee
from their abusers and attempt to keep their whereabouts hidden.”).
229. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (providing the requirements
for obtaining a protection order in each state).
230. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012) (providing the requirements for a
protection order to be given full faith and credit).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. § 2265(a).
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In application, when a victim crosses over state lines, the
protection afforded by her protection order carries over with her
into the new state, even without choosing to register the order
with the state.234 If the woman chooses to register the protection
order with the state, the state is forbidden from notifying the
responding party of the order’s registration in the new state.235
No state requires an order to be registered with the enforcing
state, but registration is beneficial in preparing enforcement
officers for a possible violation, and makes it possible for the
order to be enforced without the victim having to present the
order to the enforcement officer.236 Additionally, having the order
registered with the state allows the victim to confirm with local
authority that all the required elements are met for enforcement
to occur.237 Another state’s order will be presumed valid if “it has
the correct names of the parties, has not expired, and is signed by
an issuing authority.”238 Once the validity of the protection order
is determined, the officer is obligated to enforce all of the order’s
terms as issued, but will use the enforcing state’s procedures for
enforcing the order.239
234. See id. § 2265(d)(2) (“No prior registration or filing as prerequisite for
enforcement. Any protection order that is otherwise consistent with this section
shall be accorded full faith and credit, notwithstanding failure to comply with
any requirement that the order be registered or filed in the enforcing State,
tribal, or territorial jurisdiction.”).
235. See id. § 2265(d)(1) (“A State . . . shall not notify or require notification
of the party against whom a protection order has been issued that the protection
order has been registered or filed in that enforcing State . . . unless requested to
do so by the party protected under such order.”).
236. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES, supra note 29
(advising victims crossing over state lines to “get certified copies of [the]
protection order and carry at least one copy . . . at all times. . . [and p]rovide
copies of the protection order to any law enforcement agency that you may ask
to enforce your protection order”).
237. See id. (advising the victim to register her order in order to ensure
adequate enforcement of the order).
238. NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, FULL FAITH
http://www.bwjp.org/files/
AND CREDIT: ENFORCING PROTECTION ORDERS,
bwjp/files/PocketGuide_forWeb.pdf.
239. See id. (“A responding officer must enforce the terms and conditions of
the order as written by the issuing jurisdiction. . . . [The order] should be
enforced pursuant to departmental policy and the laws of the enforcing
jurisdiction.”).
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Because of this application of full faith and credit to
protection orders, without a uniform application of the remedies,
a protected party would be able to cross state lines to avoid the
remedies or penalties offered in her own state, and still get the
enforcement from the new state.240 For example, if the fining
system did not exist universally, the penalty assessed to the
fleeing petitioner would vary based on which state she is in. With
a universal system, every state would mete out a penalty for the
victim’s repeated contact with her abuser, and there would be no
excuse for a woman to claim that she did not know that her
actions would bear a penalty. Creating a uniform system of any of
the proposed remedies allows for an adequate response to this
disparate enforcement, while also reducing the confusion that the
petitioner or respondent may incur when trying to determine how
the protection order will be applied.
VI. Conclusion
The law of domestic violence has evolved in the past few
decades to provide the maximum protection to the victims of
abuse, which typically requires the dissolution of the
relationship.241 Although domestic violence is stereotypically a
crime against women, recent studies have shown that abuse
between couples is increasingly mutual, making it difficult to
determine who should be the restrained party in the typical
protection order scenario.242 With these changes in the roles that
parties in an abusive relationship play, there is a need to
recognize the circumstances surrounding a violation, and, most
importantly, the role that the protected party plays in the
violation.243
240. See supra Part V.A–C (providing the proposed remedies).
241. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1550 (“More recently, the law has
offered victims legal relief, but the relief generally requires ending the
relationship.”).
242. See supra notes 8–9 (referencing recent findings that women are more
likely to be the perpetrator of abuse and a growing trend of mutual abuse in
domestic abuser relationships).
243. See supra notes 8–9 (noting the changing social norms of protection
orders, including same sex domestic abuse, and increased frequency of the male
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A violation that occurs when a man is driving his wife to the
hospital is not equivalent to a situation where a man shows up at
his victim’s house and severely beats her.244 The law needs to
provide a mechanism to distinguish between these two scenarios,
ensuring that punishment occurs when it is deserved, rather than
as an automatic penalty to contact. The strongest avenue for
providing a solution is to create mechanisms that come into effect
at the back end of a violation, stepping in to protect the
respondent when the victim’s actions have undermined the
purpose of the protection order.245 With changes to the system of
protection order issuance and enforcement, the system will be
able to provide a remedy to individuals in an abusive relationship
that provides the victim protection, while preventing the victim
from abusing the purpose of the order.

being the victim of abuse).
244. See supra Part I (comparing two disparate situations of domestic abuse
and the resulting penalties).
245. See supra Part V.C (advocating for a system that would consider the
role of the woman’s enticement after the violation has been reported).

